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Abstract In recent years computer technologies and digital devices have become 
ubiquitous in all facets of  human existence, including crime and deviant behavior. 
Various forms of  criminality have emerged in which technical entities play a substantial 
role. It can be argued that such a development urges criminologists and anthropologists 
to draw more attention to the significance of  things in crime. Latour’s (2005) actor-
network theory (ANT), which considers non-human entities as active participants of  the 
social, could be a useful approach for extending our analytical focus to the non-human. 
The article will not only asses why, but also how we can apply ANT as a more-than-
human methodology in qualitative research, by discussing three ANT-based 
methodological principles: ‘follow the tool’, ‘follow the hybrid’ and ‘follow the network.’ 
In this scope, this article draws on earlier conducted qualitative ANT case studies on 
different forms of  high-tech cybercrime. In a more general vein, the article aims to show 
that innovations in qualitative research methods can be also informed by theory.  
Keywords Actor-network theory, cybercrime, qualitative research methods, non-human 
agency 
ATLANTA (March 2018) — The City of  Atlanta’s 8,000 employees got the word on Tuesday that 
they had been waiting for: It was O.K. to turn their computers on. 
But as the city government’s desktops, hard drives and printers flickered back to life for the first time in 
five days, residents still could not pay their traffic tickets or water bills online, or report potholes or graffiti 
on a city website. Travelers at the world’s busiest airport still could not use the free Wi-Fi. 
Atlanta’s municipal government has been brought to its knees since Thursday morning by a ransomware 
attack — one of  the most sustained and consequential cyberattacks ever mounted against a major 
American city. 
The digital extortion aimed at Atlanta, which security experts have linked to a shadowy hacking crew 
known for its careful selection of  targets, laid bare once again the vulnerabilities of  governments as they 
rely on computer networks for day-to-day operations.  
(Alan Blinder and Nicole Perlroth, The New York Times, March 2018) 
The above newspaper article shows how devastating cyberattacks such as ransomware 
can be. Our lives have become so dependent on and intertwined with information and 
communication technology (ICT) that one single attack can paralyze the infrastructure 
of an entire city for days.  The news article is also quite a clear contemporary illustration 
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of  Bruno Latour’s claim that various incommensurable elements, ranging from local 
cities to the World Wide Web, from governments to businesses, from hard drives to water 
bills, are all caught up in the same story (Latour 1993; 2005). A cyberattack can only be 
fully understood when we look at the various human and non-human entities that bring 
it together and when we consider their multiple associations. Furthermore, the article 
reveals the significance of  ‘things.’ When objects like our computers or printers stop 
working they can cause a lot of  trouble for humans, even drastically disrupt public life. It 
then becomes questionable, as Latour argues, whether we can view these things in a 
passive or mundane way (Latour 1992; 2005). They can permit, afford, support, enable 
or disable various activities we, humans, are involved in. Should we then not consider 
them as full-blown actors just like humans, as Latour argues?  
Latour’s plea for a more active treatment and consideration of  ‘things’ in the social 
world and even granting them with agency has received praise, but also a lot of  criticism 
(Vandenberghe 2002). Whether one agrees with Latour or not, it can be argued that his 
vision in respect to the significance of  things is worth (re)considering in light of  current 
cybercrime developments. In high-tech cybercrimes, such as ransomware or botnets, 
‘things’ obviously play a prominent role in the commission of  the crime. At the same 
time, we might be dealing with a different kind of  things than those Latour and his 
associates  were referring to in their formulation of  actor-network theory (hereafter 1
ANT), such as hammers, seat belts, automated doors and guns. For example, most types 
of  malicious software can replicate themselves without any human interventions and 
what (malicious) digital tools can do or cause in cyberspace is often not very predictable. 
This suggests that we criminologists and anthropologists might need to think differently 
about the relationship between the human (the perpetrator) and the machine.  
In my dissertation, I argued that we should move beyond an anthropocentric view in 
criminology and treat nonhuman entities as more active participants in the study of  
high-tech cybercrime (Van der Wagen 2018a). Current studies in the field of  
cybercrime, whether positivistic or constructivist, still tend to place the human agent at 
the center of  the criminological inquiry. Criminology, and the same goes for 
anthropology, also lacks a set of  concepts that would enable us to study the agency of  
non-humans in crime and deviant behavior.  Especially when we want to study the more 
high-tech cybercrimes like ransomware and botnets, crimes that are still underexplored 
in both criminology and anthropology, such framework becomes necessary. Against this 
background, I explored whether the constructivist lens of  ANT, which does provide 
concepts for analyzing the role of  non-humans, could be a valuable approach for the 
study of  cybercrime. Based on my theoretical and empirical analysis, I concluded that 
ANT can enrich the theoretical repertoire of  (cyber)criminology. In my engagement 
with ANT, however, I encountered that using the approach in empirical research is quite 
a methodological challenge. ANT studies provide methodological tools, but they remain 
still rather vague when it comes to praxis and are not particularly dedicated to 
(cyber)criminological research. Existing criminological literature does not offer much 
 Actor-network theory is not solely the intellectual legacy of Latour, but also of his 1
contemporaries including Michel Callon, John Law and Annemarie Mol.  It is also important to 
stress that ANT is not a coherent and unified framework. The current article mainly (not only) 
discusses the ANT perspective of Latour. 
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guidance either. While various authors, including myself, have examined the theoretical 
potential of  ANT for the study of  crime (see e.g., Robert and Dufresne 2015), they do 
not extensively address the methodological aspect of  engaging with ANT (e.g., Nimmo 
2011; Sayes 2014; Adams & Thompson, 2011). In criminological handbooks on 
qualitative research methods, we rarely find any substantial text on ANT as a 
methodology. Therefore, it remains unclear how we can study the role of  non-human 
entities in qualitative criminological research. How can we treat them more ‘actively’ in 
our analysis? How many and which non-humans should we include and what type of  
data is suitable for an ANT analysis? Is ANT a methodology in itself  or should we 
interpret and use it as an extension of  existing methods?  
This article aims to enhance our knowledge about how a more active treatment of  non-
human entities in our analysis of  crime and deviant behavior – as propagated by ANT 
scholars - can be accomplished, with a special emphasis on the study of  high-tech 
cybercrime. The main research question of  this article is then: How can ANT be 
applied as a methodology in qualitative research on crime and deviant behavior, high-tech 
cybercrime in particular, and what is the added value of  such a ‘more-than-human’ 
approach? As will become clear in this article, departing from the constructivist angle of  
ANT also entails that this study employs a distinct approach to the question of  what is 
cybercrime. Rather than perceiving cybercrime as crime carried by a human agent using 
ICT (e.g. Yar 2013), it defines cybercrime as illicit activities (or activities conceived illicit 
by certain parties) carried out by networks of  (multiple) human and non-human entities. 
This entails that the unit of  analysis is not the human nor ICT but a hybrid of  both.  
In a more general vein, the article aims to show that innovation in research methods can 
also be informed by (innovation in) theory. The article first briefly discusses whether and 
how existing approaches in criminology provide analytical tools for including non-
human entities in qualitative inquiry. Then it discusses ANT’s understanding of  non-
human agency and the ensuing methodological principles. Hereafter the article discusses 
how these methodological principles can be applied in qualitative research on 
cybercrime. In this scope I also draw on concrete examples from (mainly) my own 
qualitative case studies in which ANT was used. This section is divided in three 
subsections: ‘follow the tool’, ‘follow the hybrid’ and ‘follow the network’. The article 
ends with some concluding remarks.   
Studying the ‘Non-human’ in Qualitative Criminological Inquiry 
Do We Actually Need ANT? 
Before discussing ANT in greater detail, we should briefly consider whether and how 
existing frameworks that are influential in both offline and online qualitative research 
offer theoretical and methodological tools for studying the role of  the non-humans in 
crime and deviant behavior. How do existing approaches, in a nutshell, conceptualize 
the role of  non-humans in social life? How does ANT relate to these approaches and 
what is it doing differently? 
As Dolwick points out, how frameworks theorize the role of  non-human entities in the 
social is interconnected with the broader question of  how they define the ‘social’ in the 
first place (Dolwick 2009).  He places existing frameworks on a continuum from a 
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narrow to a broad definition. Theorists who define ‘the social’ in terms of  ‘social 
structures’ and ‘social facts’ (e.g. Durkheim) maintain the narrowest, most restricted and 
purest definition of  the social and treat non-humans as passive, mundane and irrelevant 
for social analysis (Dolwick 2009). In Latourian terms, they are the ultimate ‘sociologists 
of  the social’ (Latour 2005). 
The next set of  approaches, involving phenomenological and symbolic interactionist 
approaches – the ‘root perspectives’ of  the qualitative criminological research tradition – 
can be grouped in the category of  frameworks that adopt a less but still narrow and 
restricted meaning of  the social. They consider the ‘social’ as ‘what occurs when 
meanings and representations are passed from person to person’ (Dolwick 2009, 22). 
The social then refers to ‘human aggregates’ or ‘humans-among-themselves’, entailing 
that the role of  material objects or things is merely considered in terms of  symbolic 
representation. In symbolic interactionist approaches this is reflected in concepts such 
‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘meaning making’ (idem). Theorists such as Goffman examine, for 
example, how material objects play a role in face-to-face interactions and various types 
of  social encounters – e.g. material objects such as furniture are part of  the decoration 
of  the front stage and items such as clothes can be seen as part of  the ‘expressive 
equipment’ that people use for presenting themselves (Goffman 1959). However, the 
work of  Goffman is not only restricted to the symbolic or expressive meaning of  things. 
He also drew attention to how the materiality of  certain objects can shape social 
interactions – for instance, in his work on the merry-go-arounds as a technical system 
shaping the relationship between riders and fellow riders and their audience (see Pinch 
2010). Although the material dimension of  the social is taken into consideration, 
symbolic interactionism is at its core still mainly human-centered. The interpersonal 
relationships between human ‘performers’ (with or without material objects) are the 
main unit for qualitative inquiry.  
Similarly, phenomenology, which is at the same time a more philosophical orientation, 
views humans as the superior actors in the universe. This is reflected in concepts such as 
‘transcendental ego’ (e.g. Sartre 1960 [1937]), ‘Dasein’ (Heidegger 1962; 1982) and 
‘lived experience’ (e.g. Schutz 1967). Phenomenology pleas for the revival of  the ‘living 
contact with the world and to return to concrete, lived human experience in all its 
variegated richness’ (Adams & Thompson 2011, 736). However, like symbolic 
interactionism, phenomenological theorists do not neglect the role of  non-humans in 
social life either. They view material objects as entities that play a role in how humans 
experience and reflect upon the life world. They are conceived as ‘things’ that can co-
shape human perceptions, emotions, spirituality and so on.  Despite this attention paid 
to the human engagement with the material world, the central unit of  analysis remains 
‘how humans are involved in their lifeworld’. Non-human entities are treated as the 
subordinate entities in the analysis (idem).  
Now ANT, known for placing human and non-humans on a more equal level playing 
field, comes into the picture. ANT can be placed at the other extreme of  the continuum, 
having the broadest understanding of  ‘the social’. For ANT, the social refers to 
‘association’ – anything and everything that assembles together, including animals, 
plants and material objects (Dolwick 2009; Latour, 2005). Subsequently, its focal point is 
also the gathering or assemblage of  many different ‘non-social’ elements. In ANT’s 
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social universe there are neither human nor non-human aggregates only hybrids of  
both. Let us now look in more detail into this line of  thinking.   
Actor-network Theory:  Theory or Method? 
‘ANT’s main shortcoming is that it is everything but a theory – which explains why it cannot explain 
anything!’ (Callon 1999, 182) 
Actor-network theory emerged already in the 1980s in the field of  science and 
technology studies (STS) and is commonly associated with the work of  Bruno Latour, 
Michel Callon, John Law and Annemarie Mol. ANT is not really a ‘theory’ of  the 
social. It provides a set of  sensitivities that can guide the researcher, but does not offer a 
one-sided, fixed and strictly defined conceptual framework one can ‘apply’ (Latour 
2004; Mol 2010). In this respect ANT is more a methodology of  how to study the social 
than a theory of the social. The term ‘theory’ is therefore somewhat ‘misleading’, which 
also counts – as Latour argues himself  – for the words actor, network and the hyphen 
(Latour 1999). ANT is particularly well known for its ideas related to the agency of  non-
humans, although ANT, Latour’s oeuvre in particular, covers a range of  various other 
viewpoints as well (see for an overview e.g. Harman 2009; Blok and Jensen, 2011). As 
announced earlier, this article mainly focuses on the issue of  non-human agency. This 
concerns a matter that has been a major source for debates and misunderstandings alike. 
For instance, some authors argue that Latour is attacking humanist thought as he 
considers non-humans as being part of  the same ontological region as humans (e.g. 
Vandenberghe 2002). Other scholars are skeptical about the fact that Latour gives so 
much credit to non-human entities in what they can bring about (e.g. Amsterdamska 
1990). She finds it absurd that the approach does not differentiate between human and 
non-humans in their role/contribution to successes and failures. I, however, believe that 
the ANT principle of  ontological symmetry does not automatically make ANT anti-
human(ist) (see also Kipnis 2015; Latour 2013). I also think that the type of  agency 
‘given’ to non-humans by ANT theorists is more nuanced than often presented by the 
critics. Below I provide a comprehensive though brief  outline of  ANT theorists’ view on 
non-human agency and related concepts and thereafter discuss the methodological 
implications of  such a ‘more than-a-human’ approach.   
ANT, like other constructivist approaches that call for a material turn or ‘turn to 
things’ (e.g. Preda 1999), claims that things, from small tools to large technical systems 
(see Sayes 2014), should be placed more in the forefront of  sociological theory for the 
reason that they play an active role in the production of  the social. As Mol explains: 
ANT ‘opens up the possibility of  seeing, hearing, sensing and then analysing the social 
life of  things – and thus caring about them, rather than neglecting them’ (Mol 2010, 
255). ANT theorists presume that objects have a crucial function in the interaction 
between people, but they also interact with humans and with other non-humans. For 
ANT theorists, things are also more than just ‘instruments’ or ‘commodities’ (e.g. Latour 
1992; Latour & Venn, 2002): ‘Besides performing practical tasks, objects help to 
stabilise, mediate, frame, articulate, enforce, and give meaning to action. They even help 
us form identities. In this sense, “we” (humans) are already hybrid collectives – we do 
not exist without things’ (Dolwick 2009, 41). It is important to stress that ANT 
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approaches do not argue that objects have a will of  their own or have an intentionality 
or consciousness in the same manner as humans. They might however act differently 
than expected or generate a different outcome than anticipated – which is why they can 
be seen as actors or mediators in certain situations rather than (functional) intermediaries 
(see also Latour and Venn, 2002; Latour, 2005).  
Along the same lines, ANT argues that agency is not merely a ‘human affair’ either, 
since we cannot make a strict divide between human ends and technical means in the 
course of  actions. It is the ‘gun-human’ hybrid that kills, the ‘car-human’ hybrid that 
drives and not merely the human actor (see also Dant 2004; Lupton 1999). Accordingly, 
ANT scholars do not approach agency, morality and intentionality from a ‘dualist 
paradigm that locates human beings and technological artifacts in two separate realms, 
humans being intentional and free, technologies being instrumental and mute’ (Verbeek 
2014, 75). Like other approaches in philosophy of  technology that view the role of  
technology in terms of  mediation, ANT does not view the role of  technology in either 
deterministic or instrumental terms, but positions itself  somewhere in between those 
extremes. ANT theorists adhere to an ‘analytical stance that grant[s] agency to non-
human entities and that downplay[s] the differences between human and non-human 
agency’ (Kipnis 2015: 44). In this view, the human and the non-human become one (a 
cyborg), yet do not lose their individual distinctness (see also Vicini & Brazali, 2015).  
Another important aspect of  ANT’s understanding of  the social, related to the above 
aspect, is that it presumes that human and non-human entities (like words in a language) 
only get meaning, acquire their attributes and obtain their strength in relation to other 
entities. Such a semiotic understanding of  reality (Law 1999) not only dissolves dualisms 
(Gad and Jensen 2015), it also offers an alternative for causal or (technological) 
deterministic explanations that seek to explain entities in relation to their environment. 
As Mol explains: ‘Causal explanations usually remove activity from what is “being 
caused”. In a network, by contrast, actors, while being enacted by what is around them, 
are still active. The actorship implied is not a matter of  freedom, escaping from a causal 
force. Instead, actors are afforded by their very ability to act by what is around 
them’ (Mol 2010, 257-258). Successes and failures (and any other effect) can then only 
be understood when we look at the network of  interrelated or associating entities (human 
and non-human actors/actants) that produced them rather than by looking at some 
external causal force (idem). When we for example look at the ransomware attack 
mentioned in the introduction of  this article, we can say that the city was ‘offline’ for 
quite some days due to the ransomware attack. However, in order to fully capture the 
causes, scope and impact of  the attack, it is important to look at all the (interconnected) 
actors involved.  
Methodological Implications of ANT’s ‘More-than-human’ Approach 
As outlined above, the standpoints of  ANT theorists are not merely theoretical – or 
perhaps not even theoretical at all  – they also suggest, which is actually the main 2
 ANT does not include any statements about the nature and extent of non-human agency. 2
Instead, it presents the issue of non-human agency as an ‘uncertainty’ (Latour, 2005), some 
‘thing’ that we have to take into account when we conduct empirical research (see further 
Sayes 2014). 
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message, to do qualitative research differently and to adopt less-human-centered 
methodologies (Dowling, Lloyd and Suchet-Pearson 2017; Sayes, 2014).  
When it comes to the application of  specific research methods, Latour generally prefers 
ethnographic fieldwork to other methods for the reason that this type of  research more 
profoundly enables us to capture what actors themselves have to say (Latour 2005; Law 
2004). The latter is a key objective of  ANT-based research. As Latour puts it: ‘The task 
of  defining and ordering the social should be left to the actors themselves, not taken up 
by the analyst’ (Latour 2005, 23). In this respect ANT follows, at least for the most part, 
the earlier discussed interactionist approaches, which also seek to produce a rich account 
of  the world of  the actors under study and to learn from them. Both ethnographic 
researchers and ANT-scholars are particularly interested in people’s everyday actions, 
activities and behaviors and want to describe these in all their complexity. They ‘eschew 
neat analytic categories in favour of  a sensitivity to messiness, contingency and non-
coherence; both acknowledge the heterogeneity of  practices and their interweaving of  
the social and the material; both are broadly inductive and place an emphasis on the 
detailed description of  what takes place ‘on the ground’ (Nimmo 2011, 113).  
ANT is, however, slightly more radical when it comes to describing what is taking place 
on the ground. ANT’s so-called ‘radical descriptivism’, involves that the researcher has 
to completely abstain from any interpretation. As Krarup and Blok explain: ANT seeks 
to make a shift from ‘theoretically interpreting human actions to obstinately ‘following 
the actor’ by tracking and mapping its multiple associations’ (Krarup and Blok 2011, 
43). This shift or view clarifies why Latour does not view ANT as a framework one can 
‘apply.’ In a dialogue between a professor and a student, Latour formulates his position 
as following: ‘I have no patience for context, no. A frame makes a picture look nicer, it 
may direct the gaze better, increase the value, but it doesn’t add anything to the picture. 
The frame, or the context, is precisely what makes no difference to the data, what is 
common knowledge about it. If  I were you I would abstain from frameworks altogether. 
Just describe’ (Latour 2004, 64).  
The other difference between ANT and other interactionist approaches, as discussed 
already, is the fact that ANT theorists assign a more active role to non-human entities 
and thus also consider them as qualitative research participants (Adams and Thompson 
2011). Methodologically this entails that the starting point in every ANT analysis should 
be that non-human objects (e.g. a gun, a hammer, a piece of  paper or a computer) need 
just as much analytical attention as humans receive, at least initially. As Latour puts it 
himself: ‘ANT is not, I repeat is not, the establishment of  some absurd “symmetry 
between humans and non-humans”. To be symmetric, for us [ANT theorists], simply 
means not to impose a priori some spurious asymmetry among human intentional action 
and a material world of  causal relations’ (Latour 2005, 76). Only afterwards (after 
following the actors), we can pinpoint the (network of) various actors in the story and 
their role and contribution (Mol 2010). An entity is then ‘labeled’ as an actor when it 
makes a difference, mediates, changes a certain state of  affairs or brings some surprises 
or disturbances. In other words, rather than taking the human as ‘the “standard 
measure” of  agency, the “standard measure of  agency” becomes dehumanized: the 
ability to make a difference’ (Sayes 2014, 141). Apart from following both human and 
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non-human entities, the ANT researcher should be sensitive to how non-humans can 
shape, affect, enable or disable certain actions, processes and outcomes.  
ANT’s symmetrical approach has been a main source of  criticism. Krarup and Blok 
(2011), for example, point out that Latour’s view places too much emphasis on the role 
of  non-humans in the social. Although Latour recognizes that morality is not solely 
constituted by tools or objects alone, he has little to say about the human or subjective 
dimension that co-shapes moral decisions. According to these authors, ANT is not 
symmetrical enough. The counterargument that I would like to bring up is that the 
added value of  ANT lies exactly in its attention to the active and even person-
transformative abilities of  non-humans. It fills an important blind spot of  (most) 
approaches (also in criminology and anthropology) that are located at the other ‘human-
focused’ extreme. Placing too much emphasis on the agency of  non-humans on the 
other hand, might indeed run the risk of  applying a too strong sense of  symmetry or 
head to the other extreme. In any case, it is quite a challenge ‘to produce accounts that 
are robust enough to negate the twin charges of  symmetrical absence and symmetrical 
absurdity’ (McLean and Hassard 2004, 494).   
Studying the Significance of ‘Things’ in Cybercrime  
Now that we have a general idea of  the theoretical and methodological assumptions of  
ANT, we move to the question of  how such an approach could be applied in 
criminological research, high-tech cybercrime research in particular. At first sight, we 
could say that ANT’s notions should not work out that much differently in the analysis 
of  cybercrime. In cybercrime/cyberspace, obviously various human and technical 
entities gather together in the commission of  the crime.  At the same time, it can be 
argued that we might be dealing with non-human entities whose properties or ‘abilities’ 
are somewhat different than the physical tools or entities Latour was referring to such as 
guns and automated doors. This in turn might either strengthen or alter certain 
theoretical and methodological notions held by ANT theorists. Below, I will discuss three 
ANT-based interconnected methodological principles that can be applied in cybercrime 
research which are based on ANT’s more general principle of  ‘follow the actor’, namely: 
‘follow the tool’, ‘follow the hybrid’ and ‘follow the network’. Each subsection first 
outlines why we should apply this methodological principle in cybercrime research and 
thereafter provides leads for the data and methods that can be used.  I will draw on 
examples from the literature and on three earlier conducted ANT case studies (Van der 
Wagen & Bernaards 2018; Van der Wagen 2018b, Van der Wagen and Pieters 2015). I 
refer to these case studies for the aim of  illustrating how we can include non-humans as 
research participants and why it matters.  
Follow the Tool  
As outlined before, ANT assigns a more active role to non-human entities in the course 
of  action for the reason that they can provoke, shape, enable or disable certain actions. 
In many cases, tools are not merely tools. Take, for example, the ‘delete button’, which 
we press when we want to remove things and move on. As Adams and Thompson point 
out, such a button is not just a tool for deletion: ‘when we accept its invitation, we enter 
into a socio-material assemblage: we are “deleting” and we could not do this without our 
delete button’ (Adams and Thompson 2011, 738). When we follow tools such as delete 
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buttons and assess how they (dis)assemble with human actants, we get a better grip of  
what role they play in particular practices and activities, like writing a scientific article 
for example! For the qualitative researcher it invites questions such as what are the 
affordances of  the tools? What does the tool do in specific actions? 
It can be argued that digital tools that are used by cyber offenders bring a new aspect 
into play since they have a less clear-cut functionality than tools such as delete buttons. 
One of  those aspects is related to foreseeability. Lehman et al. for example reveal that 
computer programs are inherently unpredictable in terms of  what they will do: ‘the 
outcome cannot be predicted without actually running it [the program]’ (Lehman et al. 
2018, 5). The authors provide an overview of  examples in which computer programs 
produced unanticipated (strange, surprising or creative) results. They concluded that 
digital or artificial entities (like biological ones) can subvert human expectations and 
intentions. A level of  unpredictability can also be found in the use of  malicious 
computer programs. Although the script or functionality of  a certain malicious tool 
might be quite fixed - e.g., the script of  a distributed denial of  service (DDoS) attack-tool 
(termed ‘booter’ or ‘stresser’) will most likely be: ‘send a lot of  traffic to a server in order 
to paralyze it’ – how much damage will be done is not predictable in advance. Hence, 
with cybercrime, more than with any other crime, we should not only follow the actions 
of  the human actor that carries out the crime, but also study the role, contribution or 
even the agency of  the tool. Treating tools as research participants ‘helps researchers 
catch glimpses of  objects in motion’ (Adams and Thompson 2011, 738) which is 
particularly relevant in the scope of  cybercrime research, where it is more likely than in 
the physical world, that an entity goes rogue. As Balzacq and Dunn Cavelty point out in 
their ANT-based study of  malware infections: ‘Viewing malware as a mediator or actor 
allows us to give malware transformative agency of  its own, detached from the “intent” 
of  the person who wrote the code’ (Balzacq and Dunn Cavelty 2016, 183).   
The follow up question is then how to ‘follow the tool’: which data and which qualitative 
research methods could be suitable? Of  course, we are social scientists and not 
computer scientists and are thus not able to study the more advanced features or the 
entire ‘life cycle’ of  cyber tools or malware. Instead, we could draw more attention to 
how such tools co-shape criminal practices in terms of  enabling, disturbing, inviting and 
so on. To illustrate how, I would like to refer to a case study (Van der Wagen & 
Bernaards 2018) in which private chat conversations between cyber offenders involved 
in the spread of  banking malware, botnets, fraud and other financial cybercrimes were 
analyzed. In the analysis, we drew explicit attention to the role of  the tools in their 
encounters. What role do they play in these crimes? What problems do offenders face in 
respect to the tools? How do offenders speak about the tools that they use? By analyzing 
the data through this angle, we found out that certain non-human entities play a more 
fundamental and active role in cybercrime than merely being a tool facilitating the 
crime.  For example, they can cause disturbances in carrying out the crime (technical 
problems) – and hereby altering the modus operandi, decision-making and successes of  
the offenders – and can cause friction in the cooperation among the involved offenders 
as well (e.g., the purchased malware or tool does not do the job). Interestingly, we also 
found indications that offenders themselves consider tools more than just tools. They 
sometimes speak about tools as if  they are ‘living creatures’, visible in formulations such 
as ‘the tool is dead or alive’. In other words, by applying the principle of  ‘follow the tool’ 
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we can unravel what the tools concretely do in a crime event and accordingly, we might 
be able to unravel certain crime dynamics more profoundly, including the coincidences, 
transformations and translations that unfold in the course of  criminal events. These 
might stay ‘black-boxed’ if  we would consider the tool as a passive and mundane entity 
and consider the human actors as the only significant agents. Such a principle can be 
also applied in the scope of  other types of  data and research settings. We could, for 
example, study cybercriminal forums where all the ins and outs of  tools are discussed or 
examine actual cybercriminal cases by analyzing police files. High-tech crime police 
investigations contain quite some information about what tools were used and how they 
co-shaped the criminal process (see further section ‘follow the network’). 
  
Follow the Hybrid  
Closely related to the previous methodological principle of  follow the tool, which 
emphasizes that we have to treat tools as research participants, we can distinguish the 
principle of  ‘follow the hybrid’ alias ‘follow the cyborg.’ As discussed before, ANT 
presumes that actions are carried out by hybrids of  human and non-human entities. It 
thereby constantly reminds the researcher ‘that research is always likely to encounter 
conglomerates or hybrids of  action rather than pure entities’ (Gad and Jensen 2010, 75). 
Humans never act alone, our actions are always intertwined with and shaped by other 
non-human entities such as credit cards, pencils, books, cars, cigarettes, guns and so on. 
They also affect how we behave and feel, which e.g. becomes clear when we look at the 
act of  driving a car (see Dant 2004; Lupton 1999). As qualitative (ANT) researchers we 
then have to include such influences in our studies as well. Methodologically, this entails 
not only focusing on interpersonal relationships (which is the focus of  symbolic 
interactionists), but also assessing how humans relate to and interact with non-humans. 
In this respect we can learn from education researchers who, for example, analyze how 
tools or software like Power Point shape the performance, knowledge and experiences of  
educators. The educator is perceived as an agent that is ‘caught up in the particular 
design imperatives, decisions, and suggestions in this software [Power Point]’ (Adams 
and Thomson 2011, 740). According to these authors, you have to include the 
‘invitational quality of  things’ in your analysis. You should not only look at what the 
object does, but also ‘listen’ to what objects themselves have to ‘say’ (e.g. water invites/
screams for a swim and sand cries out for digging). In any case, ‘follow the hybrid’ 
implies that the researcher has to focus on how human and non-human entities mutually 
shape one another’s actions by taking the invitational properties of  objects into account.  
Such a principle seems to be definitely valuable in the scope of  cybercrime research as 
well.     In cybercrime, offenders constantly use, interact with, depend on, create and/or 
attack all kinds of  non-human entities. However, there is also a difference here. Rather 
than being engaged with software such as Power Point, a program that basically has 
quite a straightforward use and functionality, cyber offenders engage with digital 
entities/computers/programs that are more transformative and adaptable and less 
static. This latter aspect I also found in my own study of  the hacker phenomenon (Van 
der Wagen 2018b), for which I conducted 10 interviews with hackers. When hackers 
speak about tools that they use or create, they tend to emphasize the transformative 
qualities of  the software: ‘Every hacker has his weapons tank with his own tools he has chosen to 
use. Usually you use an already created and existing code someone else has written and you adapt it to 
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your problem.’ The interviewed hackers also described their relationship with technology 
in terms of  an interplay (‘what will it do when I do this’, ‘playing-wise you have to learn 
how to hack’), spoke in terms of  a trial and error, and also mentioned that they got 
feedback from the system itself. These findings are mirrored in Turgeman-Goldschmidt 
standpoint that ‘despite (or because of) the fact that the computer is a machine, it invites 
play and movement’ (Turgeman-Goldschmidt 2005, 20; see also Turkle 1984). In other 
words, hackers seem to experience that they do not act alone, but in close alliance with 
the tool (see further Van der Wagen 2018b). Accordingly, the principle of  ‘follow the 
hybrid’ stresses that we should neither merely study the offender nor the technology, but 
take a look at hybrid configurations of  both. This enables the researcher to more 
profoundly grasp the relationship between the human and the machine. 
The next question is then how to ‘follow the hybrid’. Which data and which methods 
could be suitable for studying offender-technology configurations? It can be argued that 
the ‘human-tool hybrid’ or the ‘hacker-software hybrid’ can be studied in various ways. 
We could simply interview offenders and ask them to talk about the tools that they use, 
buy or create, why they use it, how they interact with it and so on. We could also ask 
them to describe what they do and how they give meaning to their actions, which is the 
approach I took in my own study of  the hacker phenomenon. Such detailed descriptions 
can offer rich insights into the process of  how hackers and tools mutually shape one 
another’s actions. The most ideal way of  applying the ‘follow the hybrid’ principle, 
however, would be to literally follow and observe hackers aka ‘hacker-tool hybrids’ in 
their practice and produce a rich account of  what they are doing. This approach fits best 
with ANT’s preference for doing ethnography extended to non-humans, but might be a 
challenge to accomplish. Although the principle of  ‘follow the hybrid’ is suitable for 
online research setting (e.g. hacker forums), it might be also suitable for offline research 
(e.g. conducting research in hacker spaces where hackers tinker with software, hardware 
and all kinds of  electronics).  
Follow the Network  
As discussed earlier, ANT presumes that relational and heterogeneous networks of  
human and non-human entities produce actions rather than ‘solistic’ actors. It does not 
a priori make a distinction between what is human or technical, everyone and 
everything is treated as a hybrid collective of  multiple interacting elements and should 
be studied as such (Latour 1993; 2005), which also explain the hyphen between actor 
and network. Graham Harman provides an analogy that captures the idea of  ‘following 
the network’ fairly well: ‘We cannot discover the nature of  a thing by looking into its 
heart, but must follow the blood that circulates from that thing through all its arteries 
and far-flung capillaries’ (Harman 2007, in Adams and Thompson 2011, 738). 
‘Following the network’ does not entail that we have to map all possible entities in a 
network/actor-network, but to search for the ‘mediators’ that make a difference (Latour 
2005). This can only be determined afterwards and is different in each single case. 
‘Every time a new case is considered it suggests different lessons about what “an actor” 
might be’ (Mol 2010, 257). Exactly here also lies the methodological challenge of  
following the network: where to begin and where to stop? Which actors to include and 
to exclude (Adams and Thomson 2011)? ANT scholars do not provide very clear 
guidelines in this respect, but want to encourage researchers not to select the actors 
beforehand.  
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It can be argued that the principle of  ‘following the network’ is very valuable and 
applicable in the scope of  cybercrime as well. To illustrate this point, I would like to 
refer to a different case study in which a large-scale botnet was studied based on the 
analysis of  police files (Van der Wagen and Pieters 2015). In this study, we were mapping 
the human and non-human entities involved in the botnet. We showed that a myriad of  
human and technical entities was involved in (shaping the) various stages of  the botnet, 
from the initiation (creation of  the botnet) to the dismantling (taking it down). Putting an 
end to this botnet required a dismantling of  the entire offender-technology 
conglomeration: arresting the human botherder, taking the infrastructure offline (in this 
case a very complex network of  different interconnected servers) and ending the 
infections of  all the compromised computers. When this would not have been done 
properly, the crime and harm would go on. The latter occurred in some later botnets, 
which I did not study. The so-called ‘Avalanche’ botnet and the ‘Conficker’ botnet 
remained active, despite the fact that the human controller(s) were arrested and the 
infrastructure was taken down. Through a so-called ‘peer-to-peer’ construction, the 
infected machines kept infecting other machines, keeping the botnet active (Security 
2018). This example shows that in cyberspace technical entities may eventually also lead 
a ‘life’ on their own, establishing new relationships with other human and technical 
entities and then generate new crimes. Following the network then requires the 
qualitative researcher to examine the grouping and re-grouping of  such hybrid 
networks.  
When it comes to the question of  how to apply the principle of  ‘follow the network’ in 
the analysis of  crime, there is no straightforward answer. As mentioned already, you 
cannot escape from making choices when it comes to which actors in the network to 
follow and where to start. In the earlier mentioned case study in which chat 
conversations between offenders were analyzed (Van der Wagen & Bernaards 2018), we 
had access to millions of  chat lines. We obviously had to start somewhere, but also to 
choose a starting point that fits within an ANT-based methodology. Accordingly, we 
decided to start with the technical entities rather than the human ones, which is also in 
accordance with the earlier discussed principle of  ‘follow the tool’. We started by 
collecting and analyzing all of  the conversations in which the keyword ‘bot’ or ‘botnet’ 
was used, since these entities/networks are an essential component in many types of  
cybercrime. From here, we sought to follow the (network of) human and non-human 
actors that were involved in the botnet and the related activities and assessed how all the 
human (e.g. botherders, crypters, spammers and coders) and non-human entities (e.g. 
servers, exploit kits, exploits, malware, files, passwords and so on) were interconnected in 
the cybercriminal chain.   
Follow the network can be also applied in the analysis of  police files, the approach we 
took in the other botnet study (Van der Wagen & Pieters 2015). Such files are actually 
quite suitable for mapping networks of  human and non-human entities. Such 
investigations, although they do not always provide the full picture of  all events and are 
eventually produced by humans (see also Nimmo’s (2011) discussion on the use of  
historical texts as data in an ANT study), include quite some information on how both 
human offenders and tools or other non-human entities are assembled together. They 
also provide more or less a chronological description of  what occurred over time, 
enabling us to study the grouping and regrouping of  networks of  entities (in this case the 
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creation, maintenance and ‘death’ of  the botnet). We could even say that police 
detectives are actually involved in ‘a more-than-human methodology’ themselves. They 
have to establish all the connections between the human (the offenders) and the non-
human elements (e.g. IP addresses, mail accounts, exploit kits, pay pal accounts) in order 
to construct the criminal fact and present the evidence.  Hence, such data is definitely 3
useful in an ANT study of  cybercrime. Of  course, the ANT researcher should keep in 
mind that the mapping of  the network of  human and non-human elements by police 
officers serves the ultimate purpose of  capturing the human offender, who they consider 
as the primary agent within the network. The ANT researcher decides who/what the 
actors are after mapping them all.  
Concluding Remarks 
As qualitative researchers we always seek to find novel and innovative ways of  
conducting research, especially when we are confronted with new research subjects. 
Cybercrime, especially high-tech cybercrime, is one of  those phenomena that bring new 
challenges, both for our theories and methods. These crimes are very technical in 
nature, involving that various technical entities (e.g. exploit kits, malware, stressors) play 
a key role in the commission of  these crimes. As a consequence, our existing 
anthropocentric frameworks, which are mainly preoccupied with studying human agents 
and human interactions, seem to be not completely suitable anymore. As discussed in 
my dissertation (Van der Wagen 2018a), actor-network theory could be a valuable 
alternative to consider in the scope of  cybercrime research. ANT provides a way of  
thinking that treats (technical) ‘things’ in a more active way and also promotes a less 
anthropocentric and more hybrid and complex way of  grasping the phenomena that we 
study. ANT’s theoretical notions, specifically those concerning the role of  non-human 
agency, can be positioned in the scope of  ‘mediating approaches’ in the field of  
philosophy of  technology, while methodologically ANT fits in the tradition of  
ethnography. This makes the approach to some extent quite unique, but difficult to 
grasp at the same time. As many scholars before me (including Latour himself) have also 
pointed out, getting engaged with ANT is not a clear-cut or pre-definable path. The 
main instruction you get as a researcher is: go into the field and just ‘follow the actor’ 
and make sure that your notebook is filled with maps and traces of  various human and 
non-human actants, their connections, disconnections and so on.  
This article addressed what such a ‘more-than-a-human’ methodology might look like in 
practice, by discussing three ANT-based methodological principles in light of  findings 
from my own case studies in the field of  cybercrime. ‘Follow the tool’ incites researchers 
to look at the active role of  non-human entities in criminal actions and events, 
presuming that cybercriminal events are not merely orchestrated by human offenders. 
‘Follow the hybrid’ aka ‘follow the cyborg’ sensitizes the cyborgian nature of  
cyberoffending: it helps to identity the various way in which offenders and technology 
configure together (become one). ‘Follow the network’ resembles the principle that we 
have to map the range of  human and non-human actors involved in the story, which 
enables to capture the complexity of  the phenomenon under study. Obviously, these 
 Obviously, this principle of mapping the connections between humans and non-human and 3
starting of things themselves also applies to traditional crimes such as murder in which police 
officers e.g. have to connect a murder weapon with a human agent.
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principles are complementary and not mutually exclusive. They can also be applied in 
the analysis of  different types of  data ranging from interviews, (online) observations to 
police files. 
Of  course, there are also some critical questions or issues to address when it comes to 
the more-than-human methodology as propagated by ANT. Does ANT truly bring you 
to different places that cannot be reached by using more conventional methods? Based 
on my own research, I would say that ANT is definitely able to explore new paths, to 
add a new dimension to existing methods and to put things into a different perspective. 
Its hybrid and symmetrical view of  agency is particularly valuable in cybercrime 
research, since it enables to look at both the role of  human and technical entities in 
shaping these crimes. However, this does not mean that I consider ANT as a ‘theory of  
everything’ or a ‘magic method’ that is able to get it all right. Instead, I consider ANT as 
a lens – a ‘hybrid’ of  theory and method – that is particularly suitable for shedding light 
on certain dimensions that are crucial in grasping high-tech crime and deviant behavior, 
as outlined in this article. It is complementary to existing qualitative methods that we 
already employ and can enrich and broaden our focus. I think qualitative criminological 
researchers, not only those that are involved in studying cybercrime, should take ANT 
more seriously and further assess it possibilities and value. As I tried to demonstrate in 
this article: innovation in research methods can be informed and accomplished by 
innovations in theory as well. However, the opposite is also true, especially in the case of  
ANT. As Sayes points out: ‘by foregrounding the role of  methodology, we better 
understand what it means to say that nonhumans have agency’ (Sayes 2014, 144). 
Obviously, granting agency to non-humans might also have some social implications. 
For example, it definitely raises questions about responsibility and guilt. Does ANT’s 
hybrid conception of  agency take the blame away from the human agent? Verbeek 
provides a clear answer to this issue by arguing that it does not ‘reduce human morality, 
but adds to it; it shows dimensions that normally remain underexposed. Conceptualizing 
the moral significance of  things does not undermine human responsibility by blaming 
cars for accidents but rather expands the ways in which we can design, implement, and 
use technologies in responsible ways’ (Verbeek 2014, 80). Indeed, I would also not like to 
suggest that we should blame a computer virus for the damage that it causes. Even when 
a person intends to create a small rather innocent virus – but this virus eventually causes 
tremendous damage – he or she will most likely be held accountable for this unforeseen 
damage as well. Yet, what if  the person did not create the tool him or herself, but bought 
the tool or just pushed some button and was not aware of  the damage it would cause? 
And is it always possible with high-tech cybercrime to exactly determine who/what 
caused the damage (and which damage) and to map the chain of  all actors and actions 
that led to the eventual outcome? ANT does not (aim to) provide clear answers to 
questions related to intentionality and responsibility (see also Sayes 2014 on this matter), 
but it can serve as a suitable approach to exactly unravel the complexity of  cyber-crime 
events and to map and reconstruct the involved network of  (human and non-human) 
entities. It then becomes again a matter of  methodology.  
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